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The Strong U.S. Dollar: A Dilemma for Foreign Monetary Authorities DALLAS S. BATTEN and JAMES E. KAMPHOEFNER
J S o L S T E R E D by higher short-term market in terest rates and a lower rate of inflation than those abroad, the U.S. dollar has been quite strong in foreign exchange markets since the middle of 1980. Its tradeweighted value has risen 35 percent from July 1980 to April 1982.1 The general strength of the dollar has elicited sharp criticism from foreign monetary author ities who argue that a stronger dollar forces them to choose between two unpleasant alternatives: follow domestic policies that result in historically high in terest rates or accept depreciation of their currencies.
Within the standard conceptual framework of ex change rate determination, movements of exchange rates, in the short run, are caused primarily by changes in interest-rate differentials.2 Specifically, an increase in U.S. interest rates relative to those abroad should result in an increase in the foreign currency value of the dollar, other things equal. As the above criticisms demonstrate, however, exchange rate movements also may play an important role in influencing monetary 'The trade-weighted exchange rate is an average of the value of the dollar against 10 other currencies weighted by each country's trade share. The countries included are Belgium, Canada, France, Ger many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. For a more detailed explanation, see "Index of the Weighted-Average Exchange Value of the U.S. Dollar: Revi sion," Federal Reserve Bulletin (August 1978), p. 700. The tradeweighted foreign interest rate presented below is a weighted average of short-term market interest rates for the same countries using the same weights. 2To be technically correct, short-run exchange rate movements are motivated by differences in real interest rates, i.e ., market interest rates adjusted for expected inflation. For a more thorough discus sion, see Dallas S. Batten, "Foreign Exchange Markets: The Dol lar in 1980," this Review (April 1981), pp. 22-30. Consequently, changes in market interest-rate differentials and movements of exchange rates should be positively related only i f the changes in market interest-rate differentials reflect changes in real interestrate differentials.
policy actions in some countries, which will be reflected in turn by changes in their short-term domes tic interest rates. That is, a foreign monetary author ity's response to changes in the exchange value of its currency may be to pursue a policy that affects the levels of its domestic interest rates. Consequently, when observing movements of both the exchange rate and the interest-rate differential, it is not immediately clear whether a change in the differential causes the exchange rate to change or whether the interest rate change is a monetary policy response to the exchange rate movement.
This element of uncertainty has been especially prevalent for the first three quarters of 1981. Chart 1 presents the trade-weighted foreign currency value of the dollar and the difference between the U.S. threemonth CD rate and the trade-weighted foreign in terest rate. While these two series exhibit the expected positive relationship before the first quarter of 1981 and after the third quarter of 1981, they display no statistically significant relationship during the first three quarters of 1981.3
On the other hand, chart 2 contains the tradeweighted foreign currency value of the dollar and the trade-weighted foreign interest rate. The relationship between these two series shows a much different pat tern than that between the dollar and the interest-rate differential. While demonstrating only a weak positive relationship before 1981, the trade-weighted value of the dollar and the trade-weighted foreign interest rate S o u r c e : B o a rd o f G o v e r n o r s o f th e F e d e r a l R e s e rv e S y ste m follow extremely similar paths during the first three quarters of 1981. Beginning in the last quarter of 1981, however, their paths diverge radically, with the tradeweighted foreign interest rate in April 1982 falling to its July 1980 level, while the dollar continues to rise in general.4 Foreign monetary authorities apparently have been relatively more responsive to exchange rate movements (especially of the dollar) during most of 1981 than previously. Moreover, it also appears that foreign monetary authorities recently have changed their response to an increasingly strong dollar.
The purpose of this article is to examine this recent experience using an analytical framework that de scribes and evaluates the policy alternatives available to a foreign monetary authority whose currency is de preciating. O f particular importance are the rela tionship between external and internal policy objec tives, the role played by exchange rate movements in the formation of domestic monetary policy and the consequences of the policy choice.
POLICY ALTERNATIVES
Since the difference between U .S. and foreign short-term interest rates is a primary determinant of short-run exchange rate movements, a monetary au thority has essentially three policy choices when domestic interest rates (adjusted for relative inflation rates) are below those of another country. First, it can do nothing and allow its exchange rate to depreciate sufficiently to compensate for the interest differential. In this case the economy will incur increased do mestic unemployment in the short run as domestic resources are reallocated from the production of non tradable goods to the production of tradable goods in response to changing relative prices. If the exchange rate movement is expected to be only temporary, however, this reallocation may be undesirable since relative prices are expected to return to previous levels. Furthermore, it is possible that domestic prices
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may rise with the prices of imports as domestic demand shifts to import-competing products.0
Second, it can adopt a tighter monetary policy to raise short-term domestic interest rates, thereby re ducing the interest-rate differential and mitigating the downward pressure on its exchange rate.6 If this tight er stance conflicts with the country's domestic objec tives, the short-run costs of this choice are increased dom estic unem ploym ent and lower real output growth.
Third, a monetary authority can intervene in foreign currency markets by purchasing its own currency with its reserves of foreign currency. This would increase the demand for domestic currency relative to foreign currency and produce, at least temporarily, a reduc fThe monetary authorities of most of the industrial countries other than the United States employ interest rate targeting as a means of controlling their money supplies. Consequently, a desire to lower the rate of money growth will lead to an increase in market interest rates (at least in the short run). Casual observation of the rela tionship between short-term market interest rates and the rate of money growth in these countries supports this conclusion.
tion in the downward pressure on its exchange rate. It is not immediately clear whether the intervention will affect the exchange rate permanently. Consequently, an investigation of the conditions under which in tervention will permanently affect the long-run path of exchange rate movements is crucial in determining whether intervention can be effective in counteracting the impact of unfavorable interest-rate differentials on the exchange rate.'
In analyzing the permanent nature of the impact of central bank intervention on the exchange rate, one must distinguish sales or purchases of foreign curren cies that affect the size of the domestic money supply Intervention policy may not be necessarily aimed at permanently affecting the exchange rate. Instead, its focus may be simply to smooth short-run exchange rate fluctuations without having any impact on the long-run path of exchange rate movements. In this latter case, intervention that only temporarily affects exchange rates is sufficient to accomplish this objective. See, for example, Michael Mussa, "The Role of Official Intervention, Occasional Paper No. 6 (Group of Thirty, 1981) . The purpose of this article, however, is to analyze policy alternatives designed to counteract the impact of unfavorable interest rate differentials. Consequent ly, the presumed goal of smoothing short-run exchange rate fluctuations is ignored here. from those that do not.8 Specifically, intervention is said to be "sterilized" if its impact on the domestic money supply is offset by the sale or purchase of domestic assets by the central bank. Intervention is said to be "unsterilized" if its effect on the level of commercial bank reserves and, consequently, the domestic money supply is not offset (see box).
Unsterilized Intervention and Exchange Rate Movements
Suppose, for example, that the Fed attempts to pre vent the dollar from depreciating by purchasing dollars with Deutsche marks (DM) . If this intervention is unsterilized, it can affect the exchange rate in at least three ways. First, because the Fed's purchase of dol lars temporarily increases the flow demand for dollars relative to the supply of dollars, the immediate effect should be an appreciation of the dollar (or a deprecia tion of the Deutsche mark).9 This result, however, will be only transitory unless the Fed continues to pur chase dollars day after day, thereby maintaining the higher flow demand for dollars.10 Second, since this transaction is unsterilized, it causes the U.S. money supply to fall and the German money supply to rise. All other things equal, there will be an excess demand for U.S. money in the United States and an excess supply of German money in West Germany -a stock disequilibrium that can be rec tified only if aggregate spending falls in the United States and rises in Germany. This decline in U.S. spending and rise in German spending will cause the general price level in the U.S. to fall and that in Ger 9If the purpose of the intervention activity is to "lean against the wind," its impact may be insufficient to offset completely the effect of changes in fundamental determinants of the movement of the exchange rate. Consequently, intervention activity may not com pletely reverse the direction of exchange rate movements, but only slow the rate of change. many to rise and, at the same time, motivate a perm a nent appreciation of the dollar.11
Finally, market participants may interpret the de crease in the U.S. money stock as an indication of further tightening of monetary policy by the Fed in the future. Since an exchange rate is the relative price of two specific financial assets (the two domestic monies involved), it is crucially influenced by expectations about the course of future events. Consequently, ex pectations of a tighter U.S. monetary policy in the future should place additional upward pressure on the current D M/dollar exchange rate as market partici pants anticipate the lower U.S. and higher German price levels described above.12
Sterilized Intervention and Exchange Rate Movements
The immediate impact of sterilized intervention is the same as that for unsterilized intervention; that is, it creates a transitory increase in the flow demand for dollars, causing a temporary appreciation of the DM/ dollar exchange rate. The net effect of sterilized in tervention, however, is simply a purchase of domestic securities with foreign securities. Consequently, neither country's money supply will be affected; in stead, private portfolios will contain fewer dollardenominated and more DM-denominated securities.
Inasmuch as sterilized intervention affects neither the monetary factors that influence the long-run be havior of prices nor the real factors that determine the relative competitiveness of the economies, it is unclear initially what lasting impact it has on the DM/dollar exchange rate. It can have a permanent impact on the exchange rate if the public views domestic and foreign securities as being im perfect substitutes for each other.13 Because these securities are denominated in different currencies, it is argued, the impact of exchange-rate movements and the possibility of ex-
The Mechanics of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
Suppose that the Federal Reserve purchases dollars (in other words, sells foreign currency -most often Deutsche marks) in foreign exchange markets in an atte m p t to p re v e n t (or slow) th e d ollar from depreciating.1 To do this, the Fed must have some Deutsche marks, which it typically acquires either by selling some of its non-negotiable DM-denominated securities to the Bundesbank or by borrowing DM from the B u nd esban k in exchange for a D Mdenominated account. Since both of these transactions are between central banks only, they have no impact on the size of either country's money stock.
The Fed then buys dollar-denominated demand de posits of foreign commercial banks held at U.S. com mercial banks and pays for them from its DM deposits at the Bundesbank. This produces an increase in for eign com m ercial banks' reserve accounts at the Bundesbank and a decrease in their demand deposits held at U.S. commercial banks. On the other hand, for U.S. commercial banks, both their reserve accounts at the Fed and their demand deposit liabilities to foreign commercial banks have declined. Since U.S. commer cial banks' reserves have fallen while German commer cial banks' reserves have risen, the U.S. money stock will decrease and West Germany's money supply will increase as a result of this foreign exchange market operation.
As this example of unsterilized intervention shows, 'Although the Federal Reserve is portrayed here as the initiator of exchange market intervention, the analysis would not differ signif icantly in the case of intervention by foreign authorities. the U.S. money supply has not been insulated from the foreign exchange market transaction. If, however, cen tral banks do not want their foreign exchange interven tion to affect their domestic money supply, they may sterilize its impact with an offsetting sale or purchase of domestic assets. Continuing the previous example, if the Fed does not want U.S. commercial banks to lose reserves as a result of its foreign exchange intervention to support the dollar, it can purchase U.S. government securities equal to the amount of the reserves that banks lose, thereby maintaining the level of reserve accounts of the U.S. commercial banks. In this man ner, the negative impact of intervention on the re serves of U.S. commercial banks is exactly offset with no subsequent change in the U.S. money stock.
In a similar fashion, the Bundesbank could neutral ize the impact of the U.S. intervention on the German money supply by draining the newly created reserves from the West German commercial banking system.2 If completely sterilized, the foreign exchange opera tion affects neither country's money supply. Private portfolios contain fewer dollar-denominated securities and more DM -denominated securities, while the F ed 's portfolio contains more dollar-denominated and fewer DM-denominated securities.
2The institutional arrangements for accomplishing this may differ across the countries; the exact means used are not important here. Moreover, if the Fed acquired DM (used to purchase dollars) by selling DM-denominated securities in private capital markets, the German money supply would not be affected by the intervention activity, and the Bundesbank would not have to sterilize the opera tion.
change or capital controls adds an element of risk to the holding of foreign assets that cannot be totally elimi nated with a diversified portfolio.14 If dollar-denominated and DM-denominated secur ities were perfect substitutes, no change in the ex change rate or in interest rates would be required to motivate investors to hold the new portfolio that con tains few er dollar-denom inated and more DMdenominated securities. If, however, these securities are not perfect substitutes, investors will be unwilling to hold the new portfolio and, at the original exchange rate and interest rates, an excess demand for dollar- denominated securities (and an excess supply of DMdenominated securities) will exist. Consequently, in vestors will attempt to acquire additional dollardenominated securities and sell DM-denominated securities in order to return their portfolios to the desired proportion of dollar-denominated to DMdenominated securities, placing upward pressure on the DM value of the dollar.10 In other words, even though the two domestic money supplies have been unaffected by the intervention activity, the resulting portfolio disequilibrium (caused by foreign and domes tic securities being imperfect substitutes) has a perma nent impact on the exchange rate.
15The realignment of portfolios will, at the same time, place upward pressure on German interest rates and downward pressure on U.S. interest rates.
Since the efficacy of sterilized intervention hinges on the imperfect substitutability of foreign and domes tic securities, the degree of substitutability that actual ly exists is crucial. Empirical tests of the existence of this risk have yielded mixed results.16 Thus, whether sterilized intervention has a significant lasting impact on exchange rates remains uncertain.
Intervention and Monetary Policy
It seems that if the monetary authority wants to influence permanently the path of its exchange rate, and not merely dampen short-run fluctuations, it must engage in unsterilized intervention. It is clear, howev er, that unsterilized intervention is tantamount to con ducting monetary policy through foreign exchange market operations. Hence, in this case, intervention is not really an alternative to monetary policy but merely a variant of it. Only sterilized intervention is a distinct policy alternative.
Since there can be only a single monetary policy stance, the role of unsterilized intervention depends critically on the importance that policymakers place on the exchange rate in relation to other economic vari ables, as a factor influencing the conduct of monetary policy. In particular, the use of unsterilized interven tion (with the concomitant impact on the domestic money supply) implies that the monetary authority places relatively more importance on reducing the risks and the real economic disturbances associated with exchange rate movements than on influencing domestic prices, output and employment.
Since the exchange rate is the relative price of two domestic monies, it is affected, among other things, by changes in the demand for foreign money, actual and expected policy changes of foreign monetary author ities, and whatever changes emanate from within the domestic economy itself. Directing domestic mone tary policy at an exchange rate target, therefore, sub jects the economy to both domestic and foreign in fluences. Consequently, the monetary authority loses its ability to control its own money supply indepen dently of foreign actions and events.17
The desire to influence the movement of exchange rates without losing control of the money supply is the primary rationale for using sterilized intervention. As discussed above, however, it is not clear that sterilized intervention has a significant lasting impact on ex change rates. Sterilized intervention may be an appropriate policy to reduce unwanted short-run variability of exchange rates for which there may be no readily identifiable cause. When monetary authorities desire to alter the path of exchange rate movements, however, sterilized intervention may be inadequate. Consequently, monetary policymakers must choose between internal and external objectives.18
RECENT EXPERIEN CE
Monetary authorities seldom choose the first policy alternative discussed above; they don't appear to like to "do nothing" about the problems that they face. Studies of central banks' demand for and use of foreign currencies, as well as reports from central banks them selves, indicate that large-scale intervention in foreign currency markets has continued since the movement to floating exchange rates in 1973.19 If central bankers desire to influence exchange rates, the policy choice narrows down to sterilized or unsterilized interven tion. Although policymakers might prefer sterilized intervention, since it appears to allow them to separate exchange rate policy from domestic monetary policy, they have come to realize that sterilized intervention will not suffice, at least in some situations. The last year and a half provides a good example of the trade-oft inherent in the choice of intervention policy.
From the middle to the end of 1980, the foreign currency value of the dollar rose along with U .S.-foreign short-term interest differentials. During this period (actually, since about November 1978), the U.S. monetary authority had intervened frequently and on a consistently large scale in foreign currency markets; it primarily "leaned against the wind, " that is, bought dollars when the dollar was depreciating and sold dollars when it was appreciating.
With the advent of the Reagan administration, the Treasury announced that it (along with the Federal Reserve) would cease daily intervention except for periods of substantial exchange market volatility. This removed an extremely large and cooperative partici pant from foreign currency markets. Consequently, foreign monetary authorities who desired to remain active in foreign currency markets were faced with two policy options if they wished to have the same impact on exchange rates as before: either increase the amount of their intervention (if they wished to con tinue to sterilize it) or sterilize less of their existing intervention.
The magnitude of foreign central bank intervention activity has not changed significantly since the change in U.S. intervention policy. There is evidence, howev er, of more unsterilized intervention since this change. These policy decisions to limit the rise in the ex change value of the dollar, however, were not costfree, as charts 3 and 4 show. Continued economic stagnation was the price paid for redirecting monetary policy. Except for Japan, all countries experienced rising unemployment and little or no real economic growth during the first three quarters of 1981.
In light of the economic conditions at the time, it is not too surprising that foreign central banks responded differently to a rising U.S. dollar at the end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 than they did at the beginning of 1981. In particular, the re-emergence of a strong dollar at the end of 1981 did not elicit a tighter monetary policy stance and the subsequent higher short-term interest rates that had occurred at the beginning of the year.22 Since, in general, these countries have con tinued to experience economic stagnation, it appears 22The increase in the rates of money growth abroad at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 1981 most likely contributed to the subse quent rise in the foreign currency value of the dollar. The point made, however, is that once a relatively strong dollar re-emerged, foreign monetary authorities did not appear to respond in the same manner as they had at the beginning of 1981.
that central banks were unwilling to exacerbate the situation by subjecting their economies to even tighter monetary conditions necessary to raise domestic in terest rates further and moderate the rise of the dollar. In fact, foreign short-term interest rates fell consider ably during the last quarter of 1981 and the first quarter of 1982. Thus, foreign central banks now seem willing to allow the foreign exchange value of their currencies to depreciate instead.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has attempted to describe, using a sim ple analytical framework, both the policy alternatives available to a central bank and their consequences. During the floating exchange rate period, central banks consistently have intervened in foreign currency markets. Because unsterilized intervention diminishes a central bank's ability to control its domestic money stock, it generally has opted to separate external and internal policy objectives by sterilizing the impact of intervention on its money stock. Sterilization, howev er, decreases the efficacy of intervention. Consequent ly, foreign central banks welcomed the U .S .' pro- In this paper, we use a quantity theory framework to examine Canadian inflation over the past decade. In addition to assessing the impact of money growth on price changes, we test for the influence of other factors commonly believed to have contributed to Canadian inflation, for instance, the relative price of energy, Canadian wage-push and the rate of unemployment. Finally, we examine the influence of U.S. monetary growth and inflation on Canadian money growth and inflation. We find that Canadian inflation is largely explained by lagged Canadian money growth. Fur thermore, we determine that Canadian monetary poli cy has not been independent from that of the United States: we find evidence of a link between Canadian and U.S. monetary growth in addition to a direct link between the U.S. and Canadian inflation rates. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETW EEN MONEY AND PRICES: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
One way to enhance our understanding of a complex system is to begin with a simple model of that system. Thus, it is instructive to consider first an economy in which market information is transmitted rapidly, and prices and wages adjust smoothly to maintain equilib rium continuously in all markets.
The Money-Price Link in a Frictionless Economy
In a smoothly operating, frictionless economy, the rate of change in prices would be determined largely by the rate of growth in the money stock. This can be derived from the well-known quantity theory of money. The quantity theory is usually written as:
where M is the stock of money, V is the velocity with which money circulates (the number of times money is used on average to finance final transactions), P is the price level and Y is the level of real income or output. According to the modern version of the quantity theory, V is a stable function of a few variables such as long-term income, interest rates and inflationary expectations.1 I f V is constant or changing at a steady rate and Y is growing at a steady rate, changes in P would be directly related to changes in M.2 Expressed as rates of change, the quantity theory can be ex pressed as:
where lowercase letters represent the values in natu ral logarithms and a dot indicates a first difference. Thus, p is the rate of change in the price level, m is the rate of change in the money stock and u is a residual term that represents the difference betw een the rate of change in velocity and that in output (u = v -y).
If output and velocity grow at the same long-term rate, the average value of u would equal zero and the average rate of inflation per year would equal the rate of monetary growth. Deviations in velocity or output growth from their long-term trend values could cause the value of u to deviate temporarily from zero. To the extent that such changes are transitory, they only tem porarily influence the rate of inflation.3 In this sense, inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon; that is, continuous growth in the money supply is necessary to sustain it.
In the above environment, factors such as increases in either real wages (brought about, say, by aggressive labor unions) or the relative price of energy could play only a limited role in explaining the rate of inflation. These factors could temporarily affect u (via their potential effect on full-employment output and veloc ity), but as long as there is no monetary accommoda tion-that is, as long as m is not influenced by these factors-their effect is likely to be short-lived.
Furthermore, in a frictionless economy, no special problem is created if the domestic rate of inflation differs from those in other countries. In such a case, the exchange rate could adjust continuously to reconcile differences between domestic and foreign rates of inflation.4 For instance, if the domestic rate of inflation is 10 percent and the rate of inflation in the foreign economy is only 5 percent, the exchange rate-de noted as the number of units of the foreign currency that could be purchased by one unit of the domestic currency-would depreciate by 5 percent in each period and only this specific depreciation would keep the relative price of domestic and foreign goods the same.
The Effect o f Frictions on the Money-Price Link
We do not live in a frictionless world. There are frictions in the adjustment process, for example, that arise from lags in the transmission of price information from one market to another and from inertia in the movement of wages and prices.0 Given these informa tion lags and temporary wage-price inflexibilities, the effect of monetary growth on inflation will not be reflected fully in one period; rather, it will be distrib uted over a number of periods.6 Taking these lags into account, the relationship between money and prices can be modeled as where ni is some weighted average o f past monetary growth rates-call it the long-term or trend rate of monetary growth-and e is a residual term.
Several caveats, however, should be added to this simple representation of the lag between money and prices. First, theoretical analysis does not specify the pattern of weights that should be used in calculating the long-term monetary growth rate-it must be dis covered empirically. Also, because these weights rep resent the lags between money and prices embedded in a particular policy regime and institutional setting, they will shift with significant changes in policy and institutions.7 Second, e represents the influence of all factors other than monetary growth. The effect of these factors also operates with lags and cannot be simply dismissed, at least theoretically, as a temporary devia tion. Finally, in a nonfrictionless economy, the ex change rate need not change smoothly to offset exactly the difference between foreign and domestic inflation rates.8 Thus, the economy generally will not be im mune from the influence of inflation in the rest of the world.
DETERMINANTS OF CANADIAN INFLATION DURING 1971-80
The Role o f Long-Term Monetary Growth
W e begin by examining the influence of long-term monetary growth. As discussed above, the specific long-term monetary growth rate that best explains inflation must be estimated empirically. We found that, for the I/1971-IV/1980 period, a simple 12-quarter average of past growth rates of Canadian M l provides an adequate measure of the long-term mone tary growth rate for Canada.9 The effect of long-term "We regressed the rate of inflation on the simple average of past monetary growth rates, using three alternative definitions of money (M l, M1B and M2) and alternative averaging periods, differing by two-quarter intervals (2, 4, 6. . .). A 12-quarter aver age of M l worked best in the sense of giving the lowest standard error of the regression. This procedure constrains the weights on past growth rates to be equal. To test this constraint, we estimated the following regression:
12 Pt = a + £ bj riit-j + e.
i -1
In the above regression, the hypothesis that b! = b2. . b12, could not be rejected at the conventional 5 percent level. Finally, note monetary growth, thus measured, on the quarterly rate of inflation in Canada is shown in regression equa tion 1 in table 2 and is illustrated in chart 1. The chart shows: (a) the actual rate of inflation measured by the quarter-to-quarter change in the GNP deflator over the period and (b) the rate of inflation predicted by the long-term monetary growth rate from equation 1 in table 2.
As chart 1 shows, the predicted rate traces quite well the sharp rise in the inflation rate up to 1974 and the gradual decline in the subsequent three years. The chart also shows that the inflation rate was much higher than the predicted rate in 1974 and, more recently, in 1979 and 1980. To facilitate a comparison between the U.S. and Canadian inflation experience, chart 2 presents the actual and predicted rates of inflation in the United States using the same procedure as for the Canadian data (regression estimates for the United States are shown in equation 4, table 2).10 As in the Canadian case, the simple 12-quarter average of M l growth pre dicts inflation quite well. Note, however, that the pre dicted rate shown in the chart also includes the effect of price controls in the United States.
Nonmonetary Influences on Canadian Inflation
Having accounted for the direct impact of monetary growth on the Canadian inflation rate, we now consid er certain nonmonetary factors that are potential causes of the residual inflation rate (the difference between the actual inflation rate and the rate predicted by long-term monetary growth). First, it is possible that the Canadian wage and price controls adopted at the end of 1975 and terminated in the third quarter of 1978 had some impact on Canadian inflation. If these controls were effective, the residual inflation rate 12 NOTE: The dependent variable is p where pis the log of GNP deflator, rfi = ( 2 mH)/12, where m is the log of M1. DUMC is the price control i = 1 dummy (for Canada, equal to one over IV/1975 IV/ -111/1978 , zero elsewhere; for the United States, equal to one over 111/1971 -1/1974, zero elsewhere). DUMA is the dummy for the after-control period (for Canada, equal to one over IV/1978 IV/ -111/1979 , zero elsewhere; for the United States, equal to one over 11/1974-IV/1974, zero elsewhere), r represents the log of an index of energy prices divided by the GNP deflator. R2 is the coefficient of determination corrected for degrees of freedom, SE is the regression standard error and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, (t-values are shown in parentheses.)
•Equation 1 is estimated using Cochrane-Orcutt adjustment with p = .357.
A third explanation that invariably arises in inflation discussions is that the rising prices were caused, at least in part, by wage-push.14 In Canada we found that the rate of monetary growth is not systematically re lated to (current or past) wage changes and, thus, there is no direct evidence that the Bank of Canada followed a policy of validating wage increases by accelerating the growth in m oney. 1 ' Even without monetary accommodation, wage-push elements may still have influenced the residual inflation rate, at least in the short run. This possibility also was rejected by the Canadian evidence, which shows that the rate of wage change (in the current and past three quarters) does should be negative during the period of controls and positive immediately thereafter.11 This pattern is sug gested by chart 1 and is confirmed by equation 2 in table 2, where the price control dummy (DUMC) is significantly negative and the dummy variable for the one-year period following the end of controls (DUMA) is significantly positive.
Second, the relative rise of energy prices, which has been regarded as a significant factor in explaining U.S. inflation, could similarly have affected Canadian prices in the 1970s.12 This hypothesis is supported by equa tion 3 in table 2, which shows that a four-quarter average of changes in relative energy prices has a sig nificant positive effect on the Canadian inflation rate.13 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 LI The rate predicted by C a n a d ia n long-term m o ne tary grow th.
The Actual Vs. Predicted Rate of Inflation in Canada
not exert a significant effect in the money-price regression.16
A fourth explanation, suggested by the Phillips curve theory, is that the residual rate of inflation may reflect the effect of excess supply or demand (in goods and/or labor markets) as measured by the unemploy ment rate.1' This explanation also was tested and re 18As in the case of wage index, the coefficients of the current and three lagged values of the unemployment rate were insignificant both individually and jointly when added to the money-price regression (including control dummies and r). A four-quarter average of the unemployment rate also did not produce a signifi cant effect.
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directly through their impact on the residual inflation rate in Canada, or both. The possible channels are presented in the flow-chart in figure 1. Both of these channels are examined here.
The Impact o f U.S. Money Growth on Canadian Money Growth
During the 1970s, despite the nominal existence of a flexible exchange rate system, the Bank of Canada often has attempted to control the movement of the Canadian-U. The effect of operating through this channel is illus trated in chart 3. In this chart, we show both the actual rate of long-term Canadian monetary growth and the rate induced by U.S. monetary growth because of Canadian exchange-rate intervention.24 The differ ence between the two rates can be viewed as the result of Canadian monetary policy actions not related to exchange market intervention.
Two interesting points emerge from this chart. First, the portion of Canadian money growth induced by U.S. money growth has been sizable and relatively stable throughout the period (it has varied between 4.2 and 6.1 percent per year). Second, the residual growth rate, as represented by the gap between the actual and the U. S.-induced rates, rose sharply in the early 1970s but has been declining gradually since the mid-1970s. Thus, the Bank of Canada's anti-inflation policy adopted in 1975 appears to be effectively reducing the nonintervention portion of Canadian money growth, while having little impact on the contribution of for eign exchange market intervention to money growth.
The Impact o f U.S. Inflation on Canadian Inflation
The Canadian rate of inflation also may be directly related to the U.S. inflation rate because of price link ages between Canadian and U .S. tradable goods. According to one hypothesis about these price link ages-called the "law of one price''-the Canadian price for goods produced both in the United States and Canada is the same as the U.S. price adjusted for the exchange rate. According to this hypothesis, the Cana dian rate of inflation would depend on the U.S. rate of inflation adjusted for changes in the exchange rate.25 It should be pointed out that even if Canadian money growth were held constant and there were no interven tion in the exchange market, an increase in the U.S. The simple version of the law of one price is based on the assumptions that the costs of making price changes and undertaking arbitrage are negligible, the goods produced in the two countries are identical in all re26In terms of the quantity theory framework, the above effect im plies that U. are related to long-term movements in U. S. prices and the exchange rate.
To explore the direct link between the U.S. and Canadian inflation, we experimented with a number of tests. First, we added the exchange-rate-adjusted U.S. inflation (pus + e, where e is the logarithm of the price of the U.S. dollar in Canadian dollars) to the moneyprice regression including price-control dummies and the relative energy price. As shown in equation 1, table 3, the effect of this variable is insignificant.29 Next, we included the U.S. inflation rate (pus) and the exchange rate change (e) as separate variables in the regression equation. In this test (see equation 2, table 3), while the U.S. inflation rate has a positive effect, the effect of the exchange-rate change is negative (both variables are significant at the 10 percent level, though not at the 5 percent level).30 We are, thus, unable to find a con sistent effect of the exchange rate on Canadian infla tion. One explanation of this is that the exchange rate exhibited little or no time trend during the flexible 29Up to three lagged values of the exchange-rate-adjusted U.S. inflation also were added to the regression, but their effects remained insignificant.
30 Again, up to three lagged values of both pus and e were introduced in the regression, but none of these terms produced a significant effect. A four-quarter average of e was tried, but this variable also had an insignificant influence.
exchange rate period.31 Its movements, therefore, could have been considered transitory and largely dis regarded in the adjustment of Canadian prices.
Finally, to examine the possibility that transitory and trend changes in U .S. prices may exert different effects on Canadian inflation, we divided the U.S. inflation rate in two parts: (a) the rate predicted by long-term U.S. money growth (pus) and (b) the re sidual rate (pus -pUS). Each part was entered in the regression equation separately. As shown in equation 3, table 3, this test produced the interesting result that, although the effect of the U.S. monetary-induced trend rate of inflation is positive and significant, the effect of the residual rate is insignificant. It is also interesting to note that the effect of both price-control dummies as well as that of the relative energy price is insignificant in this regression. 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1979 1978 1980 we exclude the dummy variables, the relative energy price and the exchange rate. In this equation, the Canadian inflation rate is explained by only two factors:
(1) the long-term rate of money growth in Canada and (2) the U.S. monetary-induced or trend inflation rate.
The Canadian rate of inflation predicted by regres sion equation 4 in table 3 is shown in chart 4. To illustrate the role of U.S. inflation in the Canadian price equation, the chart also shows the Canadian infla tion rate that would have been predicted by Canadian money growth if the U.S. inflation rate had remained constant throughout the period.33 The difference be- tween the two predicted rates can be interpreted as the contribution of the (money-growth-related) U.S. infla tion rate to the rate of inflation in Canada. As the chart illustrates, while the U .S. influence (as operating through the U.S. inflation rate) has tended to lower the predicted rate of inflation in Canada during the early 1970s and in the control period, it has added to the predicted rate during the 1973-74 period and, more recently, in the post-control period.34
It was noted earlier that the Canadian rate of infla tion has stayed well above the rate predicted by the 34It is interesting to note that because of lags between U.S. money growth and inflation, the effect of monetary-induced U.S. infla tion on Canadian inflation in 1973-74 and the post-control period has, in fact, been produced by rapid U.S. money growth prior to these periods.
Canadian long-term monetary growth in 1979 and 1980. Chart 4 shows that this difference can be ex plained for most of the period by taking into account the effect of the monetary-induced U.S. rate of infla tion. As can be seen from the chart, although there are large deviations in the first two quarters of 1978, the predicted inflation rate (based on both Canadian money growth and U.S. trend inflation rate) tracks the actual inflation rate quite well in the remainder of the 1979-80 period.
The above discussion of the impact of U.S. money growth and inflation on the rate of inflation in Canada has highlighted two channels through which the effect of U.S. money growth is transmitted to Canadian infla tion. As illustrated in figure 1, U.S. money growth influences inflation in Canada via: (1) Canadian money growth and (2) U.S. inflation. The first channel oper ates because of the Bank of Canada's policy of inter vening in the exchange market. It is interesting to point out that this policy also may have strengthened the second channel. For instance, if the Bank of Cana da had not attempted to influence the exchange rate and followed an independent monetary policy, the exchange rate may have shown a pronounced trend which may have offset, at least in part, the effect of monetary-induced U.S. inflation on Canadian infla tion.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has examined the role of a number of factors in determining the rate of Canadian inflation over the last decade. The evidence shows that long term monetary growth-as measured by the average rate of growth of Canadian M l over the past 12 quar ters-is a key determ inant of Canadian inflation. Furthermore, after taking into account the effect of long-term Canadian monetary growth, factors such as wage-push and unemployment did not exert a signifi cant effect on Canada's inflation rate.
The article also has examined the transmission of inflation from the United States to Canada. It finds that long-term U.S. monetary growth-also measured by a 12-quarter average of past money growth rates-con tributed significantly to Canadian inflation in two dis tinct ways: (1) U.S.monetary growth directly affected Canadian monetary growth, and (2) the monetaryinduced portion of U.S. inflation-the part of the infla tion rate explained by long-term U .S. monetary growth-directly affected Canadian inflation (holding constant the effect of Canadian monetary growth). The link between U.S. and Canadian monetary growth arises, in our view, from the Bank of Canada's policy of not allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate freely. In deed, it is possible that this policy of exchange rate management also may have strengthened the direct link between U.S. and Canadian inflation.
Recently, monetarism has been criticized in Canada because the Bank of Canada, while apparently success ful in reducing the rate of growth of Canadian M l, has been unable to significantly reduce inflation. This arti cle suggests that Canada's difficulties in controlling inflation can be explained, at least in part, by taking into account the effect of U.S. long-term monetary growth on Canadian inflation.
Does 'Tight' Monetary Policy Hurt U.S. Exports? DALLAS S. BATTEN and CLIFTON B. LUTTRELL
T A HE competitive position of U.S. exports in for eign commodity markets has deteriorated over the past year. O f the reasons proffered, the major one has been the adverse impact of the rising exchange value of the U.S. dollar in foreign currency markets. It is argued that a rising dollar makes U.S. exports less competitive in foreign markets by causing their foreign-currency prices to rise relative to those of commodities pro duced in other countries.1 One sector especially affected is the farm sector. In fact, farm exports are expected to decline in fiscal 1982, the first such decline in 13 years (chart 1).
The ultimate "blame" for the dollar's strength has been placed on the Federal Reserve's current "tight" monetary policy stance, that is, its desire to reduce the long-run rate of money growth.2 As one noted agri cultural economist has remarked: This article assesses the validity of this claim that the reduced competitiveness of U .S. exports is due pri marily to the Federal Reserve's monetary policy stance. Specifically, this article focuses on the impact of money growth on inflation and exchange rate move ments over both short-and long-run periods to investi gate how U.S. exports are affected.
THE DETERMINATION OF PRICES AND THE EXCHANGE RATE: A LONG-RUN VIEW
The domestic price level and the exchange rate are determined jointly by the supply of money relative to the amount that individuals desire to hold. The supply of money essentially is determined by the monetary authority. The demand for money (i.e ., an individual's desire to hold a portion of his wealth in the form of money) is determined primarily by income, interest rates, prices and price expectations. The equilibrium price level, then, is the one (given the level of income, interest rates and price expectations) that induces indi viduals to hold the exact quantity of money that mone tary authorities are supplying.4 Any other price level motivates individuals to attempt to hold more or less money than is being supplied by altering their spend ing until the price level is driven to its equilibrium level.
Changes in the spending of consumers affect not only domestically produced goods and services, but commodities produced abroad as well. Altered de mands for foreign commodities, in turn, produce changes in the U.S. demand for foreign currencies and, as a consequence, changes in the foreign ex change value of the dollar, all other things equal. In other words, a monetary disequilibrium, through its impact on aggregate spending, induces a change in the 4For simplicity, the analysis here is performed within a static framework. A dynamic analysis would be couched in terms of growth rates instead of levels of the variables examined. For example, if the supply of money in the United States is less than the amount that individuals desire to hold, both an excess demand for money and an excess supply of goods, services and securities exist at current prices. In an attempt to increase their money holdings to the desired level, individuals decrease their spend ing on all goods and services, placing downward pres sure on domestic prices. This excess demand for money is associated with decreased spending, not only on domestically pro duced commodities, but also on commodities pro duced abroad. The decreased demand for foreign com modities motivates a decrease in the demand for for eign currencies by U.S. importers. With a given sup ply of foreign currency, the foreign currency value of the dollar will rise.
In the long run, the foreign currency value of the dollar should rise sufficiently to offset the differences between foreign and U.S. prices resulting from the initial excess demand for money. For example, if prices in the United States fall by 10 percent relative to those in Germany, then the Deutsche mark price of the dollar should rise by 10 percent, other things equal.0 If domestic price level and exchange rate adjustments occur simultaneously and if export prices move with the general price level, the initial excess demand for money will have no long-run effect on either the for eign currency price of U.S. exports or the competitive positions of U.S. exporters in foreign markets. The domestic deflation (or, in dynamic terms, disinflation) would exactly offset the impact of the exchange rate appreciation on the foreign-currency price of U.S. goods.
This relationship can be seen quite clearly in chart 2. This chart displays (a) the trade-weighted foreign cur rency value of the dollar and (b) the difference between the U.S. rate of inflation (measured by the CPI) and the trade-weighted rate of inflation of the Group of Ten co u n trie s (ex clu d in g th e U n ited S ta te s) plus Switzerland.6 It is apparent from the chart that, when the rate of domestic inflation in the United States falls relative to that of its major trading partners, the foreign currency value of the dollar rises and vice versa. 1
DOMESTIC PRICES AND THE EXCHANGE RATE: A SHORT-RUN VIEW
In the short run, producers cannot tell immediately whether a decrease in aggregate demand (spending) is permanent or just a temporary aberration. Conse quently, their initial reaction is to decrease production rather than to lower prices. That is, the excess demand for money initially induces a slowdown in economic activity. O f course, as soon as the decline in spending has been identified as permanent, producers will lower prices and increase production back to "normal" 7Chart 2 is not intended as a proof of purchasing power parity, but simply a demonstration that the rate of inflation and the exchange rate are jointly determined by excess money growth; that is, one does not cause the other.
levels.8 Thus, the impact of the excess demand for money on output eventually vanishes, leaving only prices permanently affected; however, these long-run effects are not realized immediately.
On the other hand, the exchange rate responds to this excess demand for money much more rapidly than do the prices of domestic commodities. This occurs because the exchange rate is the relative price of two assets (two currencies); unlike commodity prices, it is determined in highly organized markets that quickly assimilate new information in the same efficient man ner as the prices of other financial assets (e.g., stocks and bonds). Therefore, the exchange rate will appreci ate before prices of commodities fall sufficiently to eliminate completely the excess demand for money.9
During this interim period, U.S. exporters will face a deteriorating competitive position in foreign mar kets. The foreign currency prices of their products will have risen temporarily because the dollar appreciates before commodity prices fully adjust to the monetary disequilibrium.
INAPPROPRIATE POLICY RESPONSES
The argument that tighter monetary policy during the past few years has strengthened the dollar and thus reduced the competitiveness of U .S. goods in foreign markets has elicited several proposed policy re sponses. Among these are increased protectionism, increased subsidization of U.S. exports, a return to an easier monetary policy stance, and large-scale in tervention in foreign exchange markets.10 Since the impact of a tighter monetary policy on the competitive position of U .S. exports is only a short-run phe nomenon, such policy reactions are inappropriate.11 In particular, policy responses designed to rectify the short-run disequilibrium actually will exacerbate the equilibrating process and, consequently, lengthen the period of adjustment. Moreover, redirecting domestic T h e normal level of production and its path over time is deter mined primarily by the availability and the rate of growth of productive resources. monetary policy (directly or by intervening in foreign exchange markets) to external objectives, by defini tion, subordinates the domestic objectives of monetary policy. Any acceleration of money growth to alleviate the short-run effect of past policy actions ultimately would have no favorable long-run impact on U.S. com petitiveness in foreign markets. It would result simply in a higher rate of U. S. inflation and a lower exchange value of the dollar.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Those who feel that exports have been harmed by a tight monetary policy have overlooked the fact that the same monetary policy that causes the dollar to strengthen in foreign currency markets also causes the rate of domestic inflation to decline relative to that in other countries. These two events (i.e., a rising dollar and falling U.S. inflation) exactly offset each other over time. Consequently, foreign importers of U.S. prod ucts can purchase fewer dollars with a given amount of their currency but can purchase more U.S. goods with those dollars.
A tighter monetary policy in the United States rela tive to monetary policies abroad is reflected in the exchange value of the dollar more quickly than in the relative prices of export goods, which reduces tempo rarily the competitiveness of U.S. exports. Such a poli cy, however, has no impact on our long-run competi tive position. Consequently, foreign exchange market intervention, trade restrictions or other policy re sponses designed to offset this short-run disequilib rium situation are neither necessary nor justified.
Money and Inflation in Israel: The Transition of an Economy to High Inflation ZALMAN F. SHIFFER
I s R A E L is a small, open economy with a population of about 4 million and a per capita national income in 1981 of about $5,400.1 For a long period, until the beginning of the 1970s, it had experienced relatively low inflation and high real economic achievements in terms of employment, economic growth and consump tion. During the 1970s, however, Israel s economic performance deteriorated sharply: real GNP growth fell from about 9 percent to 3 percent per year, and the rate of inflation accelerated dramatically to over 100 percent per year (unemployment, however, remained relatively low for most of the decade). At the same time, the import surplus -the difference between the value of imports and exports -rose to levels that were considered unmaintainable in the long run (see tables 1 and 2).2
The dismal experience of the Israeli economy, like similar developments in other countries, was related to the economic adjustment to higher energy prices. Other countries also were subject to lower real growth and higher inflation since 1973. However, the accel eration of inflation was particularly acute in Israel (see  table 3 ). In addition to the oil price shocks, Israel faced changing military and political conditions that resulted in higher levels of defense expenditures and govern ment deficits. The deterioration of the Israeli econo mic performance in the 1970s was, therefore, also re lated to the effect of the external burdens imposed on Israel. Finally, the rapid transition to high inflation also reflected the relative low priority assigned by policymakers to the goal of price stabilization and the specific mix of policy measures used to achieve the different policy goals.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the sources and mechanisms of monetary growth in Israel I in particular the inflationary process during the past dec ade. Section 1 discusses the relative importance of the changes in money demand and money supply in the Israeli inflationary process. Section 2 surveys the sources of money supply growth, with special empha sis on the financing requirements of the public sector. Section 3 discusses how the exchange rate policy and the debt management policy have created a highly adaptive money supply process, and section 4 deals with the short-and long-run implications of this struc ture on the inflationary process. Section 5 analyzes the historical evolution of the inflationary process and, finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
MONEY DEMAND, SUPPLY AND INFLATION
Inflation can be defined as a sustained increase in the general price lvel or, equivalently, as a sustained ero sion of the value of money (i.e., the amount of goods and services that one unit of local currency -say a dollar or a Shekel) will buy.3
The equilibrium value of money, like that of any other commodity, depends on its demand and supply. quantity of goods and services that their money bal ances can purchase -the real value of these holdings.
In other words, the equilibrium value of money, or the price level, depends on the demand for real money balances and on the nominal money supply.4
Over time, the rate of change of the price level (i.e., the rate of inflation) will reflect the difference between the rates of growth of the nominal money supply and of the real money demand. ' In analyzing an inflationary process, therefore, it is instructive to consider the forces governing the changes in real money demand and nominal money supply.
Chart la shows the rate of change of the narrowly defined money supply M j (local currency and demand deposits) and the rate of change of the consumer price level;6 the difference between these two rates is the 
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1981). This reduction mainly reflected the reaction of the real demand for money to the increase in the cost of holding money -which bears no interest -as the rate of inflation accelerated and interest rates increased. The increase in money velocity was facilitated by finan cial innovation which, to a large extent, was also in duced by the rise in the cost of holding money.7 Some "autonomous" financial innovation was also present, and the demand for money also may have been affected by changes in real wealth.8
Even if the reduction in the real quantity of money were fully attributable to shifts in money demand, it could only explain a small part of the accumulated increase in prices.9 Since the reduction in the real money balances was, in fact, primarily a product of inflation, the main factor explaining the Israeli in flationary experience is the behavior of the money supply.
'The cost of holding money is the difference between the nominal return on other assets -physical assets and interest-bearing finan cial assets -and the zero nominal return on money. As the rate of inflation increases, the gap between the return on physical goods and money widens, and the rates of interest on financial assets adjust upward (either as a result of the incorporation of inflationary expectations in nominal rates of interest or the higher return gained on indexed assets). In recent years, there has also been an increase in real rates of interest in Israel (i.e., after allowing for the effect of higher inflation on the rate of interest).
The effect of the cost of holding money on financial innovation takes time to work out. This may at least partly account for the fact that real money balances continued to decrease for two or three years after each of the two major episodes of inflationary acceleration in Israel. 
THE SOURCES OF MONEY SUPPLY CHANGES IN ISRAEL
Changes in the nominal quantity of money can be apportioned between those originating from changes in the monetary base and those resulting from changes in the "money multiplier" (the ratio between the quantity of money and the monetary base).10 Table 4 shows the extent to which the Israeli money multiplier has fluctuated from year to year. In some years, it has been an important determinant of the change in the money supply; over the long run, however, its changes have had only a secondary effect on the money supply. We shall, therefore, focus the analysis on the factors affecting growth in the monetary base. To demonstrate the significance of these flows, table 5 presents the evolution of the changes in the monetary base and in the flows affecting these changes as a percentage of GNP.13
The share of the domestic deficits of the public sec tor in GNP, already high by international standards in the 1960s, rose dramatically to 15 percent in 1973-74 and thereafter decreased, through remaining relative ly high. These deficits increased primarily because of the higher level of defense expenditures imposed on the Israeli economy since the Yom Kippur War. Domestic defense expenditures rose from an average of 9 percent of GNP in 1968-72 to 16 percent in 1973-8 1 .14 While we do not possess adequate quantitative in formation about the net flows of public loans to the private sector in the 1960s, we know that their magni tude (relative to GNP) was much lower than in the 1970s. Most of these loans were granted, until recent years, at low nominal interest rates that were adjusted to the increase in the rate of inflation only partially and belatedly.lo This policy brought about a considerable increase in the difference between the flow of new loans, which reflected current prices, and the flow of old loan repayments, which was determined by the historically low prices and rates of interest. Table 5 reveals that the increase in the share of public deficits and loans in GNP has not been accompa nied by an increased reliance on monetary base expan sion as a source of government finance (i.e., in the ratio of new monetary base creation to GNP). The average ratio of monetary base change to GNP over the 1973-81 period was equal to its 1960-72 value (2.5 percent). In other words, the net increase in purchases of public debt and foreign exchange by the private sector essen tially offset the increase in the public deficits and credits.
THE ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF THE MONEY SUPPLY IN ISRAEL
The previous discussion raises the question: "Why 13Due to the way in which monetary base data were published, it is difficult to apportion the sources of change in the monetary base according to our functional classification for the full period consid ered.
14Due to increased defense imports, the increase in the share of total defense outlays in GNP was even higher (see table 2 ). De fense imports, like other direct government imports, however, have no effect on the monetary base (see above).
15Most loans to exporters have been indexed to the foreign exchange rate since 1977. The indexation of investment and mortgage loans, however, was delayed until 1979-81.
The structure of interest rates on public credits had significant adverse effects both on the efficiency of the allocation process and on income and wealth distribution.
did the Bank of Israel not increase the sale of foreign exchange and public debt to the private sector and thus bring about a lower rate of money growth and infla tion?" The answer to this question is that open market operations in these two assets were governed by con siderations other than achieving monetary control.
Sales (and purchases) of foreign exchange by the B. O. I. to the private sector are used mainly to stabilize the exchange rate, not to control money (and are generally not sterilized). The B .O .I. offers to sell (or buy) whatever quantities of foreign exchange that are necessary to stabilize the exchange rate at a policydetermined level (with minor fluctuations being toler ated in recent years). The rate of exchange determina tion and, consequently, the open market operation in foreign exchange is perceived as an instrument for achieving a gradual reduction in the import surplus, which is considered unmaintainable in the long run. In recent years, the B .O .I. has aimed at stabilizing the real rather than the nominal rate of exchange by equat ing the rate of exchange depreciation to the difference between the domestic rate of inflation and the rate of inflation in Israel's main trading markets.16
Most public debt was in the form of government bonds (some of which were held directly by the public and some of which served as coverage for long-term saving schemes, pension funds and the like). These bonds were indexed to the consumer price index and sold to the public in practically unlimited amounts at real rates of interest that were changed infrequently and within a relatively narrow range. Open market operations in public debt were used, to a large extent, to stabilize the real rate of return on government bonds in the secondary market. This policy may have reflected an evaluation that the demand for direct and indirect holding of government bonds is very sensitive to variations in the real rate of return.1' "T h e real rate of exchange is defined as EP*/P, where E is the nominal rate of exchange (domestic price of foreign exchange), P* is the level of foreign prices and P that of domestic prices. Its rate of change is E -(P -P*), where ' is a notation for rate of change and (P -P*) is the difference between the local and foreign rates of inflation. Note that the implications of a fixed real rate of exchange are different from those of a fixed nominal rate of exchange. While both imply an effect of the balance of payments on the monetary base, a fixed nominal rate of exchange tends to reduce the sensi tivity of the local price level to expansionary domestic policies, by shifting the adjustment to the balance-of-payments flows.
I7lf this were the case, the government could have lowered the average rate of interest that it had to pay on a given amount of debt by its policy of real interest rate stabilization. This also may have affected the rates of interest charged on nongovernmental bor rowers.
Some public debt was in the form of foreignexehange-indexed deposits, the volume of which was determined in recent years by the private sector de mand. The return on these deposits depended on the change in exchange rates and on international interest rates and was, therefore, not subject to manipulation for the purposes of monetary control.
Given the elastic supply conditions of foreign ex change and public debt, the private sector was able to determine its net acquisition of these assets and, thus, the net change in the monetary base. As a result, the quantity of money was largely endogenous -that is, determined by the economy rather than by explicit policy decisions. Thus, a recent econometric study has shown that the rate of money growth was significantly affected by past price changes.18 This does not mean, of course, that the money supply played no crucial role in the inflationary process. It merely indicates that under the institutional arrangements prevailing in Israel the growth of money accommodated and validated prior price changes. The endogeneity of the money stock has an important bearing on the dynamics of the Israeli inflationary process.
INFLATION WITH AN ENDOGENOUS MONEY SUPPLY
A largely endogenous money supply has important implications for the behavior of short-run price in creases, for the determination of the long-run rate of inflation and for the stability of the inflationary process.
The general price level is often subject to short-run movements that cannot be traced to previous changes in money growth or to shifts in the long-run demand for money. The general price level may react to changes in international prices, fiscal actions and many other forces that affect the equilibrium in commodity, factor and asset markets (e.g., by creating imbalances be tween the physical and financial components of the public's portfolios). If the money supply is endoge nous, the adjustment of money growth can easily mag nify and prolong the effect of these disturbances on the general price level -especially since the public is aware of the accommodating nature of the money supply. This could affect the public's inflationary ex pectations, resulting in further price increases, even higher growth of the endogenous money supply and downward adjustment of the real demand for money.
This mechanism, which has been at work in Israel for at least part of the period surveyed, explains why accel erations in the rate of price increases have tended to precede accelerations in money growth. Two factors especially have contributed to this mechanism in Israel: (a) The extensive system of indexation transfers price increases from one sector to another quickly and inflates the nominal values of indexed financial assets; (b) The experience with high and rising inflation has increased the speed with which prices adjust and shortened the lag between present price experience and changes in inflationary expectations.19
The endogeneity of the money supply also affects the determination of the long-run rate of inflation. With an exogenous money supply, the rate of inflation will converge in the long run to the difference between the given rate of nominal money growth and the rate of growth of real money demand, which depends princi pally on long-run real economic growth and the elastic ity of the demand for money with respect to real GNP. When, however, the money supply is endogenous, as is the case in Israel, there is no predetermined rate of money growth to which the rate of inflation adjusts itself. In this case, both the long-run rates of money growth and inflation are determined simultaneously as a part of a larger and more complex full-equilibrium solution.20
A long-run equilibrium interpretation of the accel eration of inflation in Israel has been suggested by Melnick and Sokoler.21 The essence of their argument is that the long-run equilibrium rate of inflation in creased in the 1970s, because (a) the ratio of the re venue from money creation to GNP (the monetary base change/GNP ratio) has been kept unchanged, and (b) in view of the reduction in the rate of real GNP growth, the maintenance of a given monetary base change/GNP ratio required a higher rate of inflation.22
The unchanged average level of the share of revenue from money creation in GNP does not, by itself, prove that the inflationary experience of the last decade reflects a transition between long-run equilibrium rates of inflation. Alternatively, this experience could be viewed as the result of a sequence of disturbances, that, given the dynamics of an endogenous money supply, have not necessarily brought the economy to a new long-run equilibrium.23 Under this view, the im pact of money creation on the public revenue would be interpreted as a result of the acceleration of inflation, instead of its cause. Table 6 contains data relating the dynamic evolution of prices to money growth and other variables over the last decade. This table presents annualized rates of change of the price level, money (Mi), two larger monetary aggregates (M4 and M5), short-term bank credit and the local price of imports. M4 is the sum of Mi and a group of relatively liquid money substitutes -tim e deposits, C D s, some types of foreignexchange-indexed deposits and tradable, CPI-indexed government bonds.24 M5, the largest monetary aggre gate on which data are available for the whole period, is the sum of M4 and some less-liquid savings accounts and foreign-exchange-indexed deposits. Similarly, short-term bank credit represents the largest credit aggregate on which data are available on a long-run basis. The domestic price of imports depends on the rate of exchange and on international prices.25
THE HISTORICAL RECORD OF MONEY AND INFLATION IN ISRAEL
The last four measures are included, because they help illuminate the nature of the relationship between money and prices. These variables reflect, at least partially, the results of policy measures and external shocks and have affected real demands and costs. In particular, statistical tests indicate the existence of In recent years, it has been argued that the Israeli economy might have moved into a stage of "bubble inflation" in which the rate of inflation is indeterminate and can explode as a result of any disturbance or change in expectations. This extreme view is not supported by the evidence: as discussed below, the two principal stages of inflationary acceleration in Israel have been triggered by nontrivial sequences of events and culminated in periods of rela tive inflationary stability. 24The liquidity of these assets is enhanced by the above-discussed policies of foreign exchange and real bond interest rate stabiliza tion. While none of these assets serves as a direct means of payment, each is largely held as temporary abode of purchasing power due to its relatively low real risk. Due to the low level of transaction cost relative to the rate of return, these assets are largely purchased for periods of a few weeks. At the end of the 1970s, the velocity of the liquid foreign exchange deposits was close to the velocity of checking accounts at the beginning of the decade.
2'Due to data limitations, the rate of change of this variable is based on end-of-period quarters (and not months). This implies that a large import price increase which occurs at the end of a quarter (like the 1974 devaluation) will also affect the next quarter data. short-run effects from both M4 and short-run bank credit to prices.26 The interpretation of the rela tionship between these variables and prices, however, must be done carefully, since they are themselves largely endogenous. In particular, the broader mone tary aggregates and credits include sizable indexed components, and the rate of exchange also is strongly affected by prices (especially since 1979). It would, however, be inaccurate to attribute the acceleration of inflation in that period solely to forces operating on the supply of money. Between June 1970 and September 1973, the domestic price of imports rose at an annual rate of 19 percent, following the imposition of import duties in 1970, a 20 percent de valuation in 1971 and international price increases in 1972-73. Had the quantity of money continued to grow at a low rate, these import price increases would have had a much smaller effect on the general price level (probably joined with lower real activity). However, the fact that money growth began to accelerate only after the first round of price increases (in spite of an earlier increase in the larger monetary aggregates) in dicates that it was, at least in part, adjusting to the short-run effects of higher import prices.30
Finally, one should note that in this period, the increase in the local price of imports was to a certain extent exogenous to the inflationary process, since it was caused by higher foreign commodity prices. On the other hand, lower money growth may have pre vented the 1971 devaluation or reduced its size.
From the 1973 War to the Foreign Exchange Reform
The October 1973 war and the ensuing political and economic international events had strong and lasting effects on the Israeli economy. The real rate of growth 28The quantity of money rose at an annual rate of 13 percent be tween the end of 1966 and mid-1970 (compared with an average 9 percent real GNP increase) and increased even more slowly in the last 18 months of that period.
"T h e increased sales were due to the combination of an improve ment in the private current account and a capital inflow induced by relatively high domestic rates of interest and a booming economy.
30That the quantity of money was adjusting to demand and not just to supply conditions is evident from the fact that its growth was considerably lower than that of the large monetary aggregates both in 1973 and afterward, as higher inflation affected the real demand for money.
fell, higher defense and oil import bills widened the current account deficit and the rise in domestic de fense expenditures increased governmental deficits.
Following the outbreak of the war, the B .O .I. con ducted a permissive policy, in particular encouraging rapid credit growth. As time passed, however, econo mic policy began to reflect the growing concern over the balance-of-payment situation. Monetary policy be came more restrictive, indirect taxation was increased and, in November 1974, the rate of exchange was devaluated by 43 percent.
The effect of the international oil price increase, the changes in taxation and the devaluation led to sharp price increases which were largely accommodated. The larger monetary aggregates grew rapidly through out 1974 (although more slowly than before in real terms). The growth of Mi, on the other hand, was considerably lower than that of the price level, thus squeezing the real value of the money balances. This development reflected mainly a downward adjustment of real money demand to the higher rate of inflation (see section 1).
The transition to restrictive policies had visible effects in the 1975-77 period. Domestic and foreign deficits shrank, economic activity was low, and all the monetary aggregates grew more slowly than the price level. The rate of inflation came down from its 1974 peak; it remained, however, considerably higher than in the pre-war period.
In June 1975, the government adopted a policy of small and frequent devaluations of about 2 percent per month (a "crawling peg system").31 This policy was motivated by the continuing concern about the balance of payment and a desire to avoid the strong destabiliz ing effects of large, infrequent devaluations.32 As a result of this policy and the absence of external supply shocks, the fluctuations in the rate of inflation were reduced considerably.
From October 1977 to the Present
In October 1977, the government embarked on a foreign exchange reform intended to contribute to 31The transition to the crawling peg system at that time might have been interpreted as a signal that the government was more com mitted to adjusting to inflation than to undertaking strong antiinflationary policies.
32The expectations for the 1974 devaluation had produced large private capital flows, and the devaluation itself brought about a sharp increase in the general price level.
greater economic efficiency. This reform included:
1) further steps in the liberalization of foreign transactions, in particular of international capital inflows and direct holding of foreignexchange bills;
2) the creation of a universally accessible class of foreign-exchange-indexed deposits;33
3) the abolition of direct export subsidies and the reduction and unification of import duties; 4) a transition from the crawling peg system to a market-determined, flexible exchange rate.
As the reform was enacted, the exchange rate depre ciated by 47 percent and the general price level partial ly adjusted upwards.34 As a result of the automatic indexation, the value of financial portfolios also in creased.
Between the reform and the end of 1978, the larger monetary aggregates rose at exceptionally high rates, even when the effect of indexation is taken into account. Thus, M4 and M5 grew respectively at 78 percent and 90 percent annual rates between Septem ber 1977 and Decem ber 1978 compared with a 56 percent annual increase in the CPI. This increase was fed, to a large extent, by sizable public loans to export ers and arge capital inflows, which were made possi ble by the reform and induced by the difference be tween the foreign and domestic interest rate.30 This upsurge in public loans and capital inflows reduced the level of real interest rates. The new foreign-exchangeindexed deposits, which offered an attractive mix of liquidity and rate of return, increased rapidly; on the other hand, the growth of M j was slower than that of the price level.
The increase of the large monetary aggregates and the lowering of real interest rates played a major role in " Before the reform, foreign exchange deposit holding was limited to agents engaged in foreign trade, banking institutions, reci pients of foreign incomes and non-residents. Strictly speaking, the introduction of the new deposits was not part of a foreign exchange reform, since they are domestic deposits indexed to the foreign exchange, not claims on foreign exchange. These deposits are not checkable.
3JThe high depreciation reflected in part the adjustment of the formal rate of exchange to the reduction of export subsidies and import duties. The price level rose by 18 percent in the last quarter of the year, compared with an average of 6.5 percent in the three former quarters. Most of the price increase in the last quarter occurred immediately after the depreciation.
35The domestic cost of foreign borrowing is i* + E e, where i* is the foreign rate of interest and E e the expected rate of exchange depreciation. Capital inflows at the end of 1978 also were affected by the anticipation of the imposition of constraints on their move ments (see below).
the increase of real domestic demand and economic activity in 1978 and early 1979.36 As the stock of finan cial assets rose relative to both physical assets and income, the private sector increased its demand for physical assets and other goods and services (especially as investment and purchases of durable goods had been low in previous years). The housing market, a traditional leading sector, experienced a boom, GNP increased rapidly and wages also rose with the demand for labor. Unconstrained by the largely adaptive money supply process, these developments culmi nated in a dramatic acceleration of the rate of price increase to about 80 percent in annual terms at the end of 1978 and the beginning of 1979.3'
The authorities were alarmed both by this sudden acceleration of price increases and by the fact that, since the reform, the rate of exchange rose consider ably more slowly than the general price level. At the beginning of 1979, the B .O .I. imposed restrictions on capital inflows and domestic bank credit growth and began to stabilize the real rate of exchange through intervention in the foreign exchange market.38 The restrictive effect of these measures, which were con tinued throughout the next years, was reinforced in 1979 by a more restrictive fiscal policy and increased purchases of foreign exchange by the private sector from the B .O .I.39 36High public demand and expectations related to the beginning of the peace-making process with Egypt also contributed to the heating up of the economy.
37This was twice the annual rate prevailing during the first three quarters of 1978.
Some observers have argued that the end of 1978 price accelera tion reflected a delayed reaction to the end of 1977 massive depreciation and relative increase in the price of tradable goods. Such a delayed reaction would have been unusual compared with earlier (and later) adjustments to cost shocks. In addition, the correction of an "excessive" increase in the relative price of trad ables would have implied logically only a future lower rate of increase in the rate of exchange relative to the rate of inflation, not necessarily an acceleration of inflation.
'^Starting in 1979, the B.O .I. generally imposed periodic ceilings on bank credit growth. These ceilings were partially accommo dated to deviations of the rate of price increase from its projected path to reduce the effects of strong real credit crunch on private economic activity. The B.O .I. also imposed a levy on foreign exchange credits (exempting exporters and other favored borrow ers).
The aim of the intervention in the foreign exchange market was to equate the average monthly rate of depreciation to the difference between the local and foreign rates of price increase (thus con trolling the average real rate of exchange along a "purchasing power parity" path). The B.O .I. did not intervene to prevent "tolerable" daily fluctuations of the rate.
39The private sector's current account deficit increased as a result of the rise in oil prices and the high demand for imported durables at the beginning of the year. The demand for the highly taxed durables also affected the government deficit.
Due to the effect of indexation and higher inflation, the large monetary aggregates increased more rapidly in 1979 than in 1978, but they were squeezed in real terms. Mi increased at an even slower rate than in the previous year and its real value decreased by 38 per cent. This reduction may have been affected by the supply forces that reduced the real values of financial portfolios in general, but principally it reflected a reac tion of the demand for (non-interest-bearing) money to higher inflationary expectations.
Real rates of interest on private credits increased dramatically and real demand and economic activity slowed down in the second half of 1979 and in 1980.40 Still, the rate of the price increase rose to a new annual peak of 150 percent in the second half of 1979, reflect ing the short-run effects of energy prices and the re duction of price subsidies.
The rate of inflation remained stubbornly high in 1980 (133 percent), apparently as the higher rates of recent price increases were incorporated into inflation ary expectations and the still remaining nominal con tracts. The growth of the large monetary aggregates outpaced that of price increase and M j grew at 90 percent -still falling in real terms.41
The economy resumed a higher real rate of growth in 1981, and, at the same time, the rate of inflation went down. This decrease was led by the short-run effect of a reduction in indirect taxation, which brought the rate of price increase to 94 percent in annual terms in the first two quarters of the year. Later on, the rate of price increase rose again.
As a result of the reduction in indirect taxation and the adjustment of income tax brackets, there was a sharp increase in the share of the domestic public sector deficit in GNP in 1981. This effect, however, was offset to a large extent by a reduction in the net flow of B .O .I. loans to exporters. The real value of the Mi balances continued to fall, but the growth of M5 kept up with the rate of inflation.42 In addition, there "'Reiil demand and certain financial demands also were affected by the anticipation of additional stricter government measures.
41The increase in the large aggregates was due, in part, to the effects of lower economic activity and real demands on taxation and the current account, a reversal of the 1979 developments. In addition, the real market value of government bonds, which had fallen in 1979, went up again.
42M4 was reduced somewhat in real terms. This was due to the successful marketing of new saving schemes with shorter redemp tion periods (saving schemes are included inM 5 but not in M4).
It is interesting to note that, while real M, continued to decrease in 1981 in spite of the reduction in the rate of inflation, the was a sharp increase in the real growth of other finan cial assets.43
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Israeli experience demonstrates the inflationary hazards of economic policies that subordinate mone tary management to the achievement of other goals.
The inadequate monetary control was technically caused by the expropriation of open market operations in public debt and foreign exchange from the arsenal of monetary instruments. More basically, it reflected the low priority of price stability when compared with other policy goals. This preference was due, to a large extent, to the ability of different economic groups to reduce some of the costs of inflation by indexation and other adjustment mechanisms.
Under the favorable conditions prevailing in the 1950s and 1960s, the Bank of Israel was able to main tain a reasonable monetary growth despite the con straints on its policy tools. This situation changed in the 1970s. In that decade, the Israeli economy was taxed heavily by changes in its defense requirements and the international economic environment. The control over monetary growth was lost, and the economy veered rapidly toward high inflation.
Israel has gone a long way along the path of adjust ment to inflation, but has been unable to neutralize fully its long-run disruptive effects. The experience with the implementation of partial anti-inflationary measures in 1979-81 reveals also that indexation and other contrivances have not eliminated the short-run costs of disinflation.
The return to reasonable price stability requires effective control over monetary growth.44 To achieve demand for unindexed money substitutes (mainly CDs) increased rapidly. As a result, the value of Mj plus the unindexed money substitutes (known as M2) increased in real terms -for the first time since 1972. 43In recent years, financial concerns have largely intervened in the stock exchange market to minimize reductions in the real market value of their stocks. This behavior has led to the argument that financial shares may be close in liquidity to government bonds. If the market value of these shares is added to M4 and M5, the rate of growth of these "augmented" aggregates would be much higher than the price level in 1981. Pension funds and other forms of long-term savings that are not included in M-, have also grown rapidly in recent years.
44The choice of the specific target aggregate should depend on the nature of the relationship between different alternative aggre gates and prices and on the controllability of different aggregates. While the first of these issues has been only partially investigated in Israel, it seems that aggregates that are tied to an unindexed monetary base (like M |) could be more easily controlled than others (like M4).
this, the management of at least one of the major sources of monetary base change must be subordinated to monetary considerations. Given the committment to real exchange rate stabilization in Israel, it seems that the best way to achieve monetary control in Israel is through the use of public debt management as an instrument of monetary control -a solution adopted in many other countries. It should be recognized, however, that if, at the same time, the real value of public deficits and loans is not reduced, the Bank of Israel will be confronted continuously with pressures to adopt accommodating policies.40
45These pressures may arise in reaction to two possible effects of high levels of public deficits and loans: a) these deficits and credits may create short-run upward pressures on the rate of inflationeither through the direct effect of the demand that they finance, or through the effect of rapid public debt accumulation by the private sector: b) to the extent that large net sales of public debt are used to finance public deficits, they exert upward pressure on real interest rates and crowd out private borrowers.
The optimal pace of disinflation in Israel may be more rapid than in lower-inflation economies that have not developed similar price adjustment mechanisms. Whatever the pace chosen, it is important that disinfla tion be carried out in a consistent way, since stop-go policies reduce the credibility of the policymakers and raise the pains of disinflation; in a democratic society like Israel, such policies may even altogether frustrate the disinflationary effort.
While the reduction ofpublic deficits and loans also can contribute to a more efficient resource allocation, the use of direct costreducing measures in the process of inflationary deceleration is more problematic (cost-reducing measures include reductions in indirect taxation, the lowering of the real rate of exchange and intervention in private price and wage determination). Such mea sures may increase the public sector deficit, induce destabilizing speculation and interfere with the efficiency of resource alloca tion. They should, therefore, be considered only as a short-run expediency and as a part of a comprehensive policy based on monetary control and lower public deficits and loans.
